Many commentators have failed to identify the important issues at the heart of the debate between Habermas and Rawls. This is partly because they give undue attention to differences between their respective devices of representation, the original position and principle (U), neither of which are germane to the actual dispute. The dispute is at bottom about how best to conceive of democratic legitimacy. Rawls indicates where the dividing issues lie when he objects that Habermas's account of democratic legitimacy is comprehensive and his is confined to the political. But his argument is vitiated by a threefold ambiguity in what he means by "comprehensive doctrine." Tidying up this ambiguity helps reveal that the dispute turns on the way in which morality relates to political legitimacy. Although Habermas calls his conception of legitimate law "morally freestanding", and as such distinguishes it from Kantian and Natural Law accounts of legitimacy, it is not as freestanding from morality as he likes to present it. Habermas's mature theory contains conflicting claims about relation between morality and democratic legitimacy. So there is at least one important sense in which Rawls's charge of comprehensiveness is made to stick against Habermas's conception of democratic legitimacy, and remains unanswered.
accepts these terms. All of which is not a knock down argument against those interpreters who construe the dispute as one between two moral theories or 'two procedures of moral thinking,' but it does constitute significant evidence against it.
1.4.
The second thing to note about Habermas's opening objections is that by straightway contrasting the Original Position with Principle (U), he appears to imply that these contrasting ideas lie at the heart of the dispute. But it should strike one as quite puzzling why Habermas would initiate a discussion of The first, more fundamental difference, he claims -which 'frames the second,' -is that Habermas's theory 'is comprehensive while mine is an account of the political and is limited to that' (RH 47) . Rawls is right not to see the difference between Original Position and principle (U) as fundamental. As we have seen,
Habermas's principle (U) is the central principle of Discourse Ethics. It is not the centrepiece of
Habermas's political theory. That honour goes to what he calls the Principle of Democracy, which states:
Only those statutes may claim legitimacy [legitime Geltung] that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. 13 Furthermore, it is fundamental to the design of Habermas's political and legal theory that the 'principle of democracy' does not depend on, or derive from, the moral principle (U), nor indeed from any moral principle, moral theory, or any actually existing morality.
The central argument of Between Facts and Norms is that the principle of democracy 'derives from the interpenetration of principle (D) and the legal form.' Principle (D) states that 'only those norms 14 are valid that could meet with the assent of all those potentially affected, insofar as they participate in ! 4 rational discourse.' (D) is held to be a rule of practical argumentation in general, i.e. one that applies to 15 all types of practical discourse. It is supposedly anchored below the threshold of morality (and politics), 16 in the deep structure of social action, and as such expresses a necessary condition of the validity of actionnorms in general -political, legal and moral norms. It is, Habermas claims, 'neutral' or 'initially 17 indifferent vis à vis morality and law'. This is what Habermas means when he later claims -with a nod 18 towards Rawls's Political Liberalism -that the principle of democracy is 'morally freestanding. ' 19 The legal form, for its part, is a matter of institutional and empirical fact. So the structure of
Habermas's theory, the relation between the three principles, reflects Habermas's view that in modern societies political legitimacy does not derive from moral norms. The principle of democracy is supposed to rationally reconstruct 'the democratic procedure for the production of law' which is the sole source of legitimacy in modern Western societies. In other words, according to Habermas, the normative force 20 (and authority) of law is sui generis; it is not borrowed from the normative force and authority of morality. That, he argues, is the mistake that thinkers such as Kant, Natural Law theorists, and K-O Apel Fairness as a 'module, an essential constituent part that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines' but that, importantly, is not dependent on any single comprehensive doctrine or any particular combination thereof (PL 12). A political conception also has to meet two further criteria: scope specificity -it only addresses issues of justice that apply to the basic structure; and publicity -it should also derive its content from the fundamental ideas contained in the public political culture (PL 11, . The latter condition is not fully met by the conception's being part of an The salient differences from Theory stem from the fact that the focus in the later work is not on justice per se, but on justice as a political conception, which meets the conditions stated above, and is thus apt to play a role in the determination of political legitimacy for a democratic constitutional liberal state. This is because the chief aim of the later work is to make a case for constitutional liberal democracy, i.e. for a régime in which the legitimacy of laws and policies flow from its having a liberal constitution and a democratic form of government, rather than for liberalism or democracy as such. Crucially, both 24 the theory provided by Rawls and the particular form of government it sets out to explain and defend have to operate, and to be made acceptable, under conditions of reasonable pluralism, which means that they can be welcomed as reasonable by free and equal citizens, whatever their comprehensive doctrine.
One consequence of his making the theory of Political Liberalism itself (not just the political régime it is a theory of) responsive to the fact of reasonable pluralism, is that Rawls has to allow that Justice as Fairness is only one among several possible political conceptions of justice (PL 450 Habermas's terms can elicit enough quasi-voluntary compliance to law to maintain social integration, or, to put it in Rawls's terms, can evince 'stability for the right reasons' (PL xlii). But to identify the issues that divide them we need to examine the different answers they respectively give to this question, paying particular attention to areas where one theorist denies something significant that the other affirms. Doing so will allow us to zero in on two important and related sets of issues that divide them.
The first and I believe most significant is, to put it briefly and much too crudely, the question of how the moral stands to the political. In other words, what role does morality (suitably specified) play in the determination of legitimate law and policy in a liberal constitutional democracy? The second set of issues concerns how the arguments of political philosophy stand in respect to the arguments by the representative of the state, or by citizens, for a liberal constitutional democratic régime. In other words how do the reasons adduced by the political theorist in support of her theory stand with respect to the reasons offered by the state to its citizens, and by citizens to one another, in support of its power to coerce them, and of other related matters such as the extent of its reach, the appropriateness of its objects, and the nature of its implementation. What exactly Rawls means by this remark is hard to discern, because he uses the concept of 'comprehensive doctrine' in at least three different senses, to mean: a) world views, religious and secular; b) actually existing moralities, or conceptions of the good; c) philosophical theories of one kind or another, including moral theories such as utilitarianism or Kantianism. Further, all of these three types of comprehensive doctrine have one feature in common, which is that they are all subject to reasonable doubt, because there are several alternatives that reasonable people might endorse. Consequently, Rawls's counterargument can be developed in at least three different ways. The way Rawls actually goes on to develop it in RH shows that the objection to Habermas he has in mind is that Discourse Theory takes too many theoretical hostages to fortune -i.e. it is 'comprehensive in sense c) -whilst Rawls's theory 'leaves philosophy as it is' (RH 49-51 & 48) .
2.3.
Rather than deny the accusation that his theory is 'comprehensive', Habermas defends himself by arguing that political theories have to take a stand on some philosophical questions, which, while beyond the domain of the political, nevertheless are not 'metaphysical' in any objectionable sense. Habermas There is another reason too. Habermas believes it better to be upfront with his philosophical commitments, because he does not think that the philosopher has to respond to the fact of reasonable pluralism, that is, to the fact that his theory is open to reasonable doubt, in the same way as the legislator and the citizen do. In the political domain reasonable pluralism is a fact, and the default assumption is that it will always be so. Hence, for strategic reasons, legislators and citizens had better not saddle their political justifications of a coercible law or policy with controversial assumptions. But the same does not hold for the political philosopher. In the realm of political theory, Habermas assumes, the unforced force of the better argument will eventually prevail, and consequently his theory will either prove itself or be overturned. In which case, Habermas thinks, there is no reason to claim, as Rawls does, that the 32 'citizens, not the philosophers, are to have the final word' on the truth or correctness of a political theory (RTMW 108). That would only be a relevant consideration if the task of political theorist was to draw up a blueprint of the good society in the manner of Fichte or Fourier. But by Habermas's lights political philosophy has long since given up the illusion that its task is to work out matters of substance like that.
So it is not a worry for a 'post-metaphysical' theory that confines itself to the task of 'clarifying the implications of the legal institutionalization of procedures of democratic legislation' (RTMW 108). The work of the political philosopher in the theoretical domain, the work of explication, clarification and rational reconstruction, is distinct from the democratic deliberation of citizens in the political domain, or as Habermas puts it, in the formal public sphere, and it matters not, if the theorist makes use of ideas that are not political values and ideas in Rawls' narrow sense set out in 1.6 above. issue, because one of Rawls's controversial views is that the justification of political theory is itself a practical political matter: i.e. it is the work of citizens in providing the reasons they owe to one another, and of the state in providing the reasons it owes to its citizens, in order to justify the laws and policies with which it demands compliance. But this practice, Rawls claims, the aim of which is to determine the legitimacy of a political system (and its basic structure), and to evince stability for the right reasons, is impeded when political philosophy reaches for materials beyond the domain of political values (in the sense defined in 1.6 above) and makes use of controversial, non-political ideas. So on this view, which
Habermas denies, meta-theoretical controversies are also practical political ones.
That said, there is further dimension to Rawls's objection to the comprehensiveness of Habermas's theory, which touches upon an even more fundamental issue dividing them, namely the relation of morality to legitimate law, and the question of the moral content and status of legitimate law.
In this case what is at issue is the extent to which, and the way in which, political legitimacy can be 'freestanding' from morality. This is a significant area of dispute. However, the point at issue is hard to pin down because the relation between morality and law in Habermas's theory is complex and somewhat diffuse. to act lawfully out of insight into its rationale, rather than out of sheer obedience to the fact that it is the law, or out of fear of sanctions they will meet if they break the law. Actually, there appear to be two claims here, a requirement of coherence, and a prohibition on inconsistency. The former is stronger than the latter, and sits well with Habermas's functional account whereby public reasons from arenas of discourse in civil society are let in to the political system by various sluices and channels, which suggests that the claim is about the moral content of law. (The stronger claim is also implied by Habermas's criticism that Rawls's idea of a political conception lacks 'deontological meaning', insofar as it is based only on a serendipitous overlapping consensus, for that criticism suggests that by contrast Habermas's conception of legitimacy better captures the 'deontological meaning' of legitimate law.) However, understood as a coherence requirement MPC would seem to be much too strong, because there are too many legitimate laws -for example those governing which side of the road citizens should drive on -which are morally speaking neither here nor there. In such cases, unlike say laws prohibiting murder or theft, coherence with morality is not in question. To be clear, MPC is not a just a theoretical requirement, and certainly not a requirement that moral philosophy's demands be satisfied by law. Rather it is a multi-dimensional requirement of consistency that has to be met within the entire system of legislation, adjudication and administration. This is because modern societies are complex and functionally differentiated entities in which the political system is 'just one action system among others' which has to be able 'to communicate through the medium of law with all the other legitimately ordered spheres of action' (BFN 302 What needs to be shown, if this line of defence is to be successful, is that by virtue of being procedural (in Habermas's sense) the discourse theory of morality is therefore not a 'comprehensive moral doctrine' in Rawls's sense. Rawls, as we have seen, uses the term 'comprehensive doctrine' in contrast to political conception. Political conceptions are scope restricted and open to justification by public reason alone. Discourse Ethics, though, is not scope restricted. Principle (U) and the norms that it validates are universal and apply to actions in all domains. So Discourse Ethics is a comprehensive moral doctrine in the sense that it is not tailored only or primarily to the basic structure.
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Political conceptions, according to Rawls, have also to meet the publicity condition. Now on
Habermas's account it looks like valid moral norms will meet the publicity condition. In TJ, depending on how it was interpreted, it formed a premise of the argument for Justice as Fairness, 25 or it was a heuristic device used to highlight the kinds of reasons supporting Rawls's two Principles of Justice.
On this see Scanlon (2003) .
26
Refer to note 9 above for a sample of literature by commentators hold the position I am arguing against.
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Fabian Freyenhagen and I have argued for this in Finlayson and Freyenhagen (eds.) (2011).
28
For example Habermas assumes that Rawls is indifferent to the truth of Political Liberalism, and is 29 advancing a non-cognitivist theory that does not aspire to truth, whereas Rawls is rather making his theory prescind from taking a stance on such sideways-on questions. Habermas also mistakenly thinks that the justification of the political conception being offered in PL is the merely instrumental one that it is the best means of securing stability (RPUR 36 Habermas, BFN, 103, 108 & 113; FG, 64-66; 1993: 13; TIO, 42-3. 40 Indeed when Habermas insists on the priority of the right over the good in his work up to and including
41
Between Facts and Norms he means the priority of questions of justice (which, you will recall, he takes to be equivalent with moral rightness) over questions of the good life, the priority of moral norms over One anonymous reviewer for this journal suggested that this answers my objection since it shows that 44 the work of ensuring consistency with morality is not that of citizens or philosophers. But that was not the worry. The worry was that MPC brings Habermas's position much closer to the 'morality first' accounts of democratic legitimacy which he rejects, and of which he claims Discourse Theory is not one. And that worry holds whether or not MPC is a functional requirement of the political and legal system as a whole.
Habermas goes on to address some of the less obvious worries in his later work on the role of religious 45 reasons. Discussion of such questions would take us too far afield. Some of the most important work is contained in Calhoun, Mendieta and Van Antwerpen (eds.) (2013). Habermas, BFN 111, 452, 453, & 457. 46 ! 29
